The Role of Financial Condition and Regulatory Capital Requirements in the Relationship Between Held-to-Maturity Classification and the Risk of Failure among Banks Listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange
Keywords:
held, to, maturity, bank financial condition, regulatory capital, bank failure risk, moderating effect, panel data, Iraqi banksAbstract
The present study aims to examine the role of banks’ financial condition and regulatory capital requirements in explaining the relationship between the classification of securities as held to maturity and the risk of failure among banks listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange. The theoretical premise of the study is that the accounting classification of securities may affect how changes in asset values are reflected in financial statements; however, it does not necessarily eliminate the economic risks arising from interest rate fluctuations, liquidity needs, or the possibility of loss realization. Using panel data for banks over the 2018–2025 period and employing a bank fixed-effects model, the study investigates the relationships among the main and control variables. The descriptive results indicate an increase in the mean use of the held-to-maturity classification from 0.194 in 2018 to 0.371 in 2025, along with an increase in the mean book-risk index from 0.063 to 0.123. In the bank failure-risk regression, the coefficient of the held-to-maturity classification is positive and statistically significant, whereas bank capital has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. Moreover, the interaction coefficient between held-to-maturity classification and bank capital is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the moderating role of capital. Nevertheless, the final interpretation depends on the operational definition of failure risk, the consistency of the number of observations, and clarification of the dependent variable used in the regulatory capital model. The findings emphasize the necessity of simultaneously assessing accounting classification, loss-absorption capacity, and capital adequacy.
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Copyright (c) 2025 Raid Albasatini (Author); Sahar Sepasi; Hossein Etemadi, Javad Rezazadeh (Author)

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